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Message Authentication Code over a Wiretap Channel
Dajiang Chen, Shaoquan Jiang, Zhiguang Qin
Abstract—Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a keyed
function fK such that when Alice, who shares the secret K
with Bob, sends fK(M) to the latter, Bob will be assured of
the integrity and authenticity of M . Traditionally, it is assumed
that the channel is noiseless. However, Maurer showed that
in this case an attacker can succeed with probability 2−
H(K)
ℓ+1
after authenticating ℓ messages. In this paper, we consider the
setting where the channel is noisy. Specifically, Alice and Bob are
connected by a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W1 and a
noiseless but insecure channel. In addition, an attacker Oscar is
connected with Alice through DMC W2 and with Bob through
a noiseless channel. In this setting, we study the framework that
sends M over the noiseless channel and the traditional MAC
fK(M) over channel (W1,W2). We regard the noisy channel as
an expensive resource and define the authentication rate ρauth as
the ratio of message length to the number n of channel W1 uses.
The security of this framework depends on the channel coding
scheme for fK(M). A natural coding scheme is to use the secrecy
capacity achieving code of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner. Intuitively, this is
also the optimal strategy. However, we propose a coding scheme
that achieves a higher ρauth. Our crucial point for this is that in
the secrecy capacity setting, Bob needs to recover fK(M) while
in our coding scheme this is not necessary. How to detect the
attack without recovering fK(M) is the main contribution of
this work. We achieve this through random coding techniques.
Index Terms—Authentication, wiretap channel, information
theoretical security
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptography, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is
a short piece of information used to authenticate a message
that it was sent by a specified legitimate sender and to provide
integrity assurance on the message. Toward this, we must first
specify an adversary model. That is, what an attacker can do
and how much power he has. A widely adopted model is to
allow an attacker to play a man-in-the-middle attack. Under
this, an attacker Oscar can send any message to receiver Bob
in the name of legitimate sender Alice. Besides, any message
from Alice must first go through Oscar, who can choose to
block, modify or faithfully deliver it. Finally, Oscar is said to
succeed if Bob accepts a source message M while Alice has
never authenticated it. To prevent attacks, Alice and Bob usu-
ally share a secret key K. If the attacker tries to authenticate
a source message to Bob before seeing any communication
between Alice and Bob, it is called an impersonation attack. If
the attacker tries to modify the message from Alice so that Bob
accepts it as an authentication of another source message, it is
called a substitution attack. In this paper, we study the above
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general model where the attacker can play an arbitrary man-
in-the-middle attack and see a polynomial number of message
authentications.
An adversary power is usually defined in two classes:
computationally bounded or unbounded. In the first class, an
adversary only has a polynomial computing power. In the
second class, an adversary has an infinite computing power.
In this paper, we are interested in an unbounded adversary.
In our work, the attacker Oscar attempts to fool Bob to
accept a fake authentication. Since a legal Bob is always
polynomially bounded, we will restricted Oscar to activate Bob
with incoming messages for a polynomial number of times.
Usually, message authentication implicitly assumes the
communication channel between Alice and Bob is noiseless.
For a detailed treatment, see Simmons [10] and also Maurer
[11]. However, under this model, any new authentication will
cause an entropy loss of the secret key and the adversary
success probability will increase. In fact, Maurer [11] showed
that after ℓ times of authentication, an adversary can succeed
in an attack with probability at least 2−H(K)/(ℓ+1), which
quickly approaches 1 with ℓ. In this paper, we investigate the
authentication problem where the channel is noisy.
A. Related works
A noise in the real world usually plays an unwanted role.
The task of digital communication is mainly to remove the
effect of a channel noise. However, in 1975, Wyner [1] was
trying to guarantee that the rate of leaked information went
to zero as block-length goes to infinity. In his model, the
channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than one between
Alice and the attacker. This result was generalized by Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [6]. Since then, the secret sharing problem has
been extensively studied (e.g., [12], [13], [14], [18]).
Even though secret sharing over noisy channels has been
extensively studied, the attention to its sibling message au-
thentication is far from enough. Korzhik et al [3] considered
the authentication problem over a (noiseless) public discussion
channel under the initialization from the noisy channels so that
the sender, the receiver and the attacker hold some correlated
data. So they essentially considered the authentication in the
noiseless channel with a noisy initialization (or simply in the
source model [8]). This framework was further studied in [19].
Lai, ElGamal and Poor [20] considered the authentication over
a wiretap channel X → (Y, Z). When Alice sends X , Bob
will receive Y via a DMC W1 : X → Y and the attacker will
receive Z via DMC W2 : X → Z. Alice and Bob share
a secret K . The channel between the attacker and Bob is
noiseless. They showed that as long as I(X ;Y ) > I(X ;Z),
they can build an authentication protocol which can authen-
ticate many source messages without significantly increasing
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an adversary success probability. From Maurer [11], this is
impossible when the channel is completely noiseless. Baracca,
Laurenti and Tomasin [2] studied the authentication problem
over MIMO fading wiretap channels. They protocol assumes
no shared key between Alice and Bob. They only considered
an impersonation attack and also assume an authenticated way
for a sender to send some preliminary data to a receiver. This
framework was further studied in [4].
B. Contribution
In this paper, we consider an authentication model as
follows. A legitimate transmitter Alice plans to send a message
and authenticate it to receiver Bob in the presence of an
adversary Oscar. It is assume that Alice and Bob share a secret
key K , and there is a DMC W1 : X → Y from Alice to Bob
and an one-way noiseless channel from Alice to Bob goes
through Oscar. In addition, there is a DMC W2 : X → Z
from Alice to Oscar and a noiseless channel from Oscar to Bob
(see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Practically, Internet, Telephone,
or a wireless communication system with an error correcting-
code can serve as this channel. We also assume that Oscar
has unbounded computing resources, and can play an arbitrary
man-in-the-middle attack and see a polynomial number of
message authentications (details in Section III).
We study the message authentication code (MAC) in these
noisy model (see Fig. 2 for an illustration): Alice encodes M
to a codeword (S,Xn) with S sent over the noiseless channel
and Xn sent over the wiretap channel (W1,W2), which arrives
at Bob as (S′, Y n), where n is the length of codeword over the
noisy channel W1 and S′ is the received version of S by Bob
through Oscar. Upon (S′, Y n), Bob decides to reject or accept
the authentication by checking the consistency of (S′, Y n).
We regard the transmission over the wiretap channel as an
expensive resource and define an efficiency measure for the
MAC as authentication rate ρauth = |M|n , where |M | denotes
the bit length of M .
The goal of the paper is to propose a MAC protocol in
the above model achieving a multi-messages authentication
with the same secret key K . The main efficiency criterion is a
minimization of the wiretap channel usage while keeping the
probability of Oscar mounting a successful attack negligible.
To achieve the goal with high efficiency, we present a natural
MAC scheme as follows. Alice first generates a traditional
message authentication code T of M and uses an channel
coding to encode T to Xn. Finally, the codeword is (M,Xn),
where M is for the noiseless channel and Xn is for channel
(W1,W2). Upon (M ′, Y n), Bob’s verification is to check the
consistency of M ′ and Y n. The main challenge is how to
design a channel coding with completeness and authentication
(details of completeness and authentication in Section III). We
addresses this issue by leveraging random coding techniques
(details in Section IV).
In the proposed scheme, we can rewrite ρauth = ρtag ·ρchan,
where ρchan = |T |n is called channel coding rate and
ρtag =
|M|
|T | is called the rate of tag. ρtag is mainly
determined by purely cryptographic techniques while ρchan
is determined by channel coding techniques. The latter is our
main focus. With secrecy capacity Cs of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[6] in mind, if we naturally encode T to Xn using their code,
we get ρauth = ρtagCs, which can be trivially generalized
from Lai’s work [20]. This intuitively seems to be the best
possible result as we have to protect T in its full secrecy.
However, we propose a new coding technique, achieving
ρauth = ρtag(H(X |Z) − δ) for any small δ > 0. As shown
in [6], when channel W1 is less noisy than channel W2, then
Cs = H(X |Z) − H(X |Y ). So the ratio of authentication
rate of the natural scheme to ours is arbitrarily close to
1 − H(X |Y )/H(X |Z) < 1. Our crucial point for this is
that the secrecy capacity guarantees that Bob can recover T
while in the setting, this is unnecessary because in case of no
attack, it can be computed from M ′ = M and K and in case
of an attack, Bob only needs to detect the inconsistency of
M ′ and Y n and reject. How to detect the attack without fully
recovering T is the non-trivial part of our work. We achieve
this through random coding techniques.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
basic concepts and results that will be used in this paper.
Section III introduces our authentication model. Section IV
introduces our MAC. Section V proves an authentication
theorem of our MAC. Section VI discusses the efficiency of
our MAC. The last section is a conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we use the following notations or conventions.
• A random variable (RV) is denoted by an upper case letter
(e.g., X,Y ); its realization is denoted by a lower case
letter (e.g., x, y); its domain is denoted by a calligraphic
letter (e.g., X ,Y); X ←U X means that X is chosen
uniformly at random from X .
• xn denotes a sequence x1, · · · , xn of length n. For a
positive integer s, define [s] = {1, · · · , s}.
• Probabilities P (X = x) and P (X = x|Y = y)
are denoted by PX(x) and PX|Y (x|y). PnY |X(yn|xn) is
defined as
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi)
3• Pxn(·) is a distribution over alphabet X , where for any
a ∈ X , Pxn(a) is the fraction of a in sequence xn.
Similarly, Pxnyn(a, b) is the fraction of (a, b) in sequence
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn).
• Distance between RVs X and X ′ is SD(X ;X ′) =∑
x |PX(x)− PX′(x)|. Conditional distance between X
given Y and X ′ is
SD(X |Y ;X ′) =
∑
y,x
PY (y)|PX|Y (x|y)− PX′(x)|.
• Entropy H(X) = −∑x PX(x) logPX(x); mutual in-
formation I(X ;Y ) =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y) log
PXY (x,y)
PX (x)PY (y)
;
conditional entropy
H(X |Y ) = −
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) logPX|Y (x|y).
• RVs X1, · · · , Xm form a Markov chain, denoted by
X1 → · · · → Xm, if PXi|Xi−1···X1(xi|xi−1 · · ·x1) =
PXi|Xi−1(xi|xi−1), for any i = 2, · · · ,m.
The following lemma [7, Lemma 1] shows the relationship
between mutual information and distance.
Lemma 1: [7] Let X and Y be two RVs over X and Y
respectively. |X | ≥ 4. Let ∆ = SD(X |Y ;X). Then
1
2 ln 2
∆2 ≤ I(X ;Y ) ≤ ∆ log |X |
∆
. (1)
A. ǫ-almost strongly universal hash function
A universal hash function essentially is a family of com-
pression functions that has an almost uniformly distributed
output. It was introduced by Wegman and Carter [15] and
further developed in [16], [17]. We now introduce the ǫ-almost
strongly-universal hash function.
Definition 1: A finite family of hash functions H from
alphabet M to a finite alphabet T is ǫ-almost strongly-
universal (ǫ-ASU) if the following holds
- |{h ∈ H : h(x) = t}| = |H||T | , ∀x ∈ M, ∀t ∈ T ,
- |{h ∈ H : h(x1) = t1, h(x2) = t2}| ≤ ǫ|H||T | , ∀x1, x2 ∈
M (x1 6= x2), ∀t1, t2 ∈ T .
We remark that domain M is not necessarily finite but T and
H are both finite. In this paper, H is indexed by elements in
a set K. We can write H = {hk}k∈K. So |K| = |H| and hk
is uniformly random in H when k is so in K.
A construction of ǫ-ASU hashing function with a good
input/output ratio will be used in this paper. Stinson [17]
showed that there exists a scheme that compresses 2s log q
length to log q length. We state it as follows.
Lemma 2: [17] Let q be a prime power and let s ≥ 1 be an
integer. Then there exists an sq -ASU hash function from M to
T with key space K0, where |K0| = qs, |M| = q2s , |T | = q.
B. Discrete memoryless channel
A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with input alphabet
X and output alphabet Y is characterized by a stochastic
matrix W = {W (y|x)}x∈X ,y∈Y , where W (·|x) is the distri-
bution of the channel output Y when the input is X = x,
i.e., W (y|x) = PY |X(y|x). In this case, we say X and
Y are connected by channel W . If the input sequence is
xn and the output sequence is yn, then PY n|Xn(yn|xn) =∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi) =
∏n
i=1W (yi|xi). For simplicity, we de-
note
∏n
i=1W (yi|xi) by W (yn|xn).
A n-length code C for a DMC W : X → Y with message
space T is a pair of functions (f, φ), where f : T → Xn is
the encoding function, φ : Yn → T ∪ {⊥} is the decoding
function, and ⊥ denotes a detection of error. For t ∈ T ,
f(t) ∈ Xn is called a codeword. When a sender wants to
send message t, he sends f(t). When a receiver receives
vector yn ∈ Yn, he decodes it to φ(yn). If φ(yn) 6= t,
an error occurs. The error probability of a code is defined
e(C) = P (φ(Y n) 6= T ), where Y n is the channel output with
message T that is uniformly random over T .
C. Typical sequences
Let xn be a sequence over X . Then the distribution Pxn(·)
is called the type of xn over X , where Pxn(a) is the fraction
of occurrences of a in xn. For a type P over X , type set TnP
denotes the set of all n-length sequences over X with type P.
Definition 2: Let X be a RV over alphabet X . xn ∈ Xn is
ǫ-typical if |Pxn(a)−PX(a)| ≤ ǫ|X | for all a ∈ X , and further
it holds that Pxn(a) = 0 for any a with PX(a) = 0. The set
of ǫ-typical sequences for X is denoted by Tn[X]ǫ .
Note that if xn ∈ Tn[X]ǫ , then the whole type set TnPxn
is included in Tn[X]ǫ . So T
n
[X]ǫ is a union of some type sets
whose type is “close” to PX . Note the form of X could be
arbitrary. Especially, it could be a vector such as X = (Y, Z).
If xn = (yn, zn) is ǫ-typical for X = (Y, Z), we say (yn, zn)
is jointly ǫ-typical. The set of jointly ǫ-typical sequences for
Y and Z is denoted by Tn[Y Z]ǫ .
Definition 3: Let X and Y be RVs over alphabet X and Y
respectively. yn ∈ Yn is conditionally ǫ-typical given xn ∈
Xn, if |Pxnyn(a, b)−Pxn(a)PY |X(b|a)| ≤ ǫ|X |·|Y| for all a ∈
X and b ∈ Y , and further it holds that Pxnyn(a, b) = 0 for
any a, b with PXY (a, b) = 0. The set of conditionally ǫ-typical
sequences for Y , given xn, is denoted Tn[Y |X]ǫ(xn). If X and
Y are connected by DMC W , Tn[Y |X]ǫ(xn) is also denoted by
Tn[W ]ǫ(xn).
We now introduce some basic properties of typical se-
quences, which are well-known and can be found in existing
information theory books (e.g. [9, Chap 1.2]).
Lemma 3: Let X1, X2, X be RVs over X and Y be a RV
over Y . Then,
1. For any type Q of Xn,
(n+ 1)−|X | · 2nH(Q) ≤ |TnQ| ≤ 2nH(Q).
2. There exists constant c > 0 s.t. for ∀ǫ > 0, ∀xn ∈ Tn[X]ǫ ,
2−n[H(X)+cǫ] ≤ PnX(xn) ≤ 2−n[H(X)−cǫ],
(1− ǫ)2n[H(X)−cǫ] ∗≤ |Tn[X]ǫ | ≤ 2n[H(X)+cǫ].
where inequality (∗) holds when n large enough.
43. There exists constant c > 0 s.t. for ∀ǫ > 0, ∀xn ∈ Tn[X]ǫ ,
∀yn ∈ T[Y |X]ǫ(xn),
2−n[H(Y |X)+cǫ] ≤ PnY |X(yn|xn) ≤ 2−n[H(Y |X)−cǫ],
(1− ǫ)2n[H(Y |X)−cǫ] ∗≤ |Tn[Y |X]ǫ(xn)| ≤ 2n[H(Y |X)+cǫ].
where inequality (*) holds when n large enough.
4. There exists constants λ1 and λ2 > 0 such that when n
large enough, for any xn ∈ Tn[X]ǫ
PnY (T
n
[Y ]ǫ) ≥ 1− 2−nλ1ǫ
2
,
PnY |X(T
n
[Y |X]ǫ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− 2−nλ2ǫ2 .
III. MAC FOR A WIRETAP CHANNEL: THE MODEL
Syntax Model. Assume that there is a DMC W1 : X →
Y from Alice to Bob. There is also an one-way noiseless chan-
nel from Alice to Bob. There is a DMC W2 : X → Z from
Alice to Oscar and a noiseless channel from Oscar to Bob.
In this section, we will formulate the message authentication
code in this channel model. It allows Alice to authenticate a
message to Bob while preventing attacks from Oscar. Let M
be the message space. The system is described by an encoding
function F : M× K → S × Xn and a decoding function
G : K × S × Yn → M∪ {⊥}. The authentication syntax is
as follows.
• If Alice wishes to authenticate M ∈ M to Bob, she
computes (S,Xn) = F (M,K). She then sends S over a
noiseless channel to Bob, and sends Xn over a wiretap
channel (W1,W2). Through Oscar, S will arrive at Bob
as S′. Let Xn, through W1, arrive at Bob as Y n and,
through W2, arrive at Oscar as Zn.
• Upon (S′, Y n), Bob computes M ′ = G(K,S′, Y n). If
M ′ 6=⊥, he outputs M ′ as the authenticated message
from Alice; otherwise, he rejects.
Note if Alice does not use the noisy channel, then our model
degenerates to a traditional MAC model. So naturally, we call
(F,G) a message authentication code (MAC) over channel
(W1,W2) and call (S,Xn) the codeword of M . For our
convenience, we define a decision bit D : K×S×Yn → {0, 1}
such that D(K,S′, Y n) = 0 if and only if G(K,S′, Y n) = ⊥
(i.e., Bob rejects).
Adversary Model. An authentication failure could come
from a completeness error or an attack from Oscar. If MAC
is designed properly, the completeness error is negligible.
So we focus on attacks. In our model, Oscar can arbitrarily
modify S over the noiseless channel. We assume that the
channel from Oscar to Bob is noiseless and hence Oscar
can launch impersonation attacks. We also allow Oscar to
learn the decision bit for each authentication. Granting Oscar
to learn this is not artificial. For instance, if Bob rejects
the authentication, he could request Alice to re-authenticate
the message. This allows Oscar to learn the decision bit
b = 0. For another instance, if M is one message in a serial
authentication procedure (such as a stream authentication),
Bob could feedback an updated message index that represents
the current successfully authenticated message. This implicitly
allows Oscar to learn the decision bit. We also wish to capture
the concern that even if Oscar has adaptively attacked many
authentication instances, he still cannot cheat Bob to accept a
false authentication. The formal model is as follows.
I. Let Mi, i = 1, 2, · · · , be the sequence of messages
authenticated by Alice. Let (Si, Xni ) be the codeword
of Mi. Alice sends Si over the noiseless channel to
Bob and Xni over channel (W1,W2). Oscar can revise
Si to arbitrary S′i ∈ S. Let Xni arrive at Bob as Y ni
and at Oscar as Zni . Let M ′i = G(K,S′i, Y ni ) and
bi = D(K,S
′
i, Y
n
i ). Besides (Si, Zni ), Oscar also learns
bi.
Note here we consider an adaptive Oscar. So he deter-
mines S′i based on Si, his local random source R and
the information collected previously: {(Sj , Znj )}i−1j=1 and
decision bits {bj}i−1j=1 in stage I and decision bits {bˆj} in
stage II below.
II. Oscar can adaptively send Sˆt ∈ S and Yˆ nt ∈ Yn to
Bob noiselessly. Oscar will learn Bob’s decision bit bˆt =
D(K, Sˆt, Yˆ
n). He succeeds if bˆt = 1.
Here (Sˆt, Yˆ nt ) is computed based on R and the informa-
tion collected previously: {(Sj , Znj , bj)} and {bˆj}t−1j=1.
In the model, Oscar can arbitrarily interleave Type I attacks
and Type II attacks. We use succ to denote the success in a
Type I or Type II attack.
Authentication Property. After introducing the adversary
model, we now define the authentication property formally.
It consists of completeness and authentication. Completeness
essentially states that when Oscar does not present, Bob should
accept M with high probability. Authentication states that
Oscar can succeed in the above two types of attacks only with
a negligible probability.
Definition 4: A message authentication code (F,G) over
channel W1 : X → Y,W2 : X → Z is secure if the following
holds (where n is the number of channel W1 uses).
1. Completeness. If Oscar does not present, then Bob
rejects with exponentially (in n) small probability.
2. Authentication. If the number of Type II attacks is
polynomially bounded (in n), Pr(succ) is negligible.
Remark. Restriction on the number of Type II attacks is
unavoidable as Oscar can always choose a message M and
impersonate with every possible (s, yn) ∈ S × Yn to Bob.
As S and Yn are finite sets, he can always succeed for some
pair (s, yn). The number of Type II attacks is chosen as be
polynomially bounded as each attack will involve Bob (as
a verifier) and it is impractical to require him to be in a
complexity class beyond a polynomial. For the same reason,
the number of Type I attacks is also polynomially bounded
(implicitly), although we do not require this.
Efficiency. We regard the communication over a wiretap
channel as an expensive resource. It is desired to minimize the
use of it. For convenience of analysis, we define the efficiency
measure for a MAC. It is called authentication rate, defined
as ρauth =
log |M|
n , which is the ratio of the source message
length to the codeword length.
5IV. OUR SCHEME
A. Random coding theorem
To construct our scheme, we will prove the existence of a
channel coding scheme that satisfies many strong properties.
It essentially states that, there exists a set C ⊆ TnP such that:
(1) C can be divided into subsets {Cij}i,j (as shown in Fig.
3) such that each column C1j ∪· · ·∪CIj is a code for channel
W1;
(2) If I is uniform random and J is an arbitrary RV but
independent for I, then for Xˆn uniformly random over CIJ
that is transmitted over a wiretap channel (W1,W2), the output
Zˆn of channel W2 is almost independent of (I, J);
(3) In item 2, if the output of W1 is Yˆ n, then for any
adversarially chosen J ′ (that satisfies certain properties), it is
unlikely that Yˆ n can be decoded using gJ′ into a codeword
in CIJ′ . The formal statement is as follows.
C11 · · · C1j · · · C1J
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ci1 · · · Cij · · · CiJ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
CI1 · · · CIj · · · CIJ
Fig. 3. The codebook used in our construction.
Theorem 1: Let X,Y, Z be RVs over X ,Y,Z respectively
such that PY |X = W1, PZ|X = W2 for DMCs W1,W2 and
that PX = P for a type P over X with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X .
Assume I(X ;Y ) > I(X ;Z) + τ for some τ > 0. Then, for
any integers I, J with
0 ≤ 1
n
log J < H(X |Y ) + τ, (2)
0 ≤ 1
n
log I < I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− τ , (3)
there exists disjoint subsets Cij ⊂ TnP , i ∈ [I], j ∈ [J] s.t. when
n large enough
1. For each j, C·j def=
⋃
i Cij is a code (fj , gj) for chan-
nel W1 that has an exponentially small average error
probability, where fj encodes a message m to the mth
codeword in C·j .
2. For any RV J over [J] and I over [I] with PIJ = PJI ,
let Zˆn be the output of channel W2 with input Xˆn ←U
CIJ . Then, I(I, J ; Zˆn) ≤ 2−nβ2 , for some β2 > 0 (not
depending on PJ ).
3. For any RV J over [J] and I over [I] with PIJ = PJI , let
Yˆ n be the output of channel W1 with input Xˆn ←U CIJ .
Assume RV J ′ over [J] with J ′ 6= J satisfying
a. SD(PJ′J ;PJ′J|I) ≤ δ1;
b. J ′ → IJ → Xˆn → Yˆ n is a Markov chain;
c. PJ′J (j
′, j) ≤ 2n
ω
J(J−1) + d(j
′, j) for any j, j′ and a
function d(·, ·) s.t. ∑j′,j d(j′, j) < δ2, where ω is a
constant in (0, 1).
Then, when n large enough,
P
(
gJ′(Yˆ
n) ∈ CIJ′
)
≤ 2−nω + δ1 + δ2.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
B. Construction
Now we describe the construction of our MAC. Let W1 :
X → Y , W2 : X → Z be the wiretap channel. Assume
I(X ;Y ) > I(X ;Z) + τ for some τ > 0 and PX be a type
P with P (x) > 0 for any x ∈ X . Let Cij , i = 1, · · · , I, j =
1, · · · , J be the subsets of TnP obtained in Theorem 1. Set
K1 = {1, · · · , I}. Let h : M× K0 → T be a ǫ-ASU hash
function with key space K0, where range T ⊂ {1, · · · , J}.
Alice and Bob share a secret key K = (K0,K1) ∈ K0 ×K1.
We now describe the encoding and decoding procedures.
1. Encode. To authenticate M , Alice computes T =
hK0(M), and randomly takes Xn from CK1T . Then the
codeword of M is (M,Xn), where M is sent over the
noiseless channel and Xn is sent over channel (W1,W2).
2. Decode. Upon (M ′, Y n), Bob computes T ′ = hK0(M ′).
If gT ′(Y n) ∈ CK1T ′ , he accepts M ′; otherwise, he
rejects, where gj is the decoder of code C·j .
Note: In the code C·j at Theorem 1, encoder fj encodes
message ℓ to the ℓth codeword in C·j , gj(Y n) must
decode to ⊥ or a codeword’s index in C·T ′ . As an index
is 1-1 correspondent to its codeword, we assume gj(Y n)
decodes to ⊥ or the codeword itself.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the authentication property of
our MAC. We begin with two lemmas. The first lemma
shows that Oscar obtains no significant amount of information
about secret key (K0,K1), after eavesdropping J times of
authentications that gives Oscar information M1Zn1 · · ·MJZnJ .
The idea is as follows. Let Tj = hK0(MJ). From Theorem
1(2), it is easy to see that I(K1Tj ;Znj |Mj = mj) ≈ 0.
Note that given Mj = mj , K0K1 → K1Tj → Znj forms a
Markov chain as Znj is decided by K1Tj and some randomness
independent of K0K1. So by data processing inequality,
I(K0K1;Z
n
j |Mj = mj) ≤ I(K1Tj;Znj |Mj = mj) ≈ 0.
As K0K1 is independent of MJ , I(K0K1;MJZn1 · · ·ZnJ ) =
I(K0K1;Z
n
1 · · ·ZnJ |MJ). Finally, by standard information
theory techniques, we can show that this is bounded by∑J
j=1 I(K0K1;Z
n
j |MJ = mJ), which is now known small.
The lemma follows by averaging on MJ . We implement the
strategy formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Let (K0,K1) be uniformly distributed over
K0 × K1 and M1, · · · ,MJ be J arbitrary messages in M
authenticated by Alice. For j = 1, · · · , J, let Znj be the output
of W2 when Alice sends Xnj (w.r.t. Mj). Then, there exists
β2 > 0 such that when n large enough,
I(K0K1;M1Z
n
1 · · ·MJZnJ ) ≤ J · 2−nβ2. (4)
Proof: For j = 1, · · · , J, let Tj = hK0(Mj). Define
MJ = M1 · · ·MJ and mJ = m1 · · ·mJ for mj ∈ M.
Then, PK1Tj |MJ (k1, tj |mJ) = PK1(k1)PTj |MJ (tj |mJ) as
K1 is independent of MJ and K0. Reformatting this, we
have PK1Tj |MJ=mJ (k1, tj) = PK1(k1)PTj |MJ=mJ (tj) =
PTj |MJ=mJ (tj)/|K1|. That is, if we rewrite the joint distri-
bution of K1, Tj when MJ = mJ , as Pm
J
K1Tj
, then PmJK1Tj =
6Pm
J
Tj
/|K1|. Hence, by Theorem 1 (property 2), when n suffi-
ciently large, we have I(K1, Tj;Zn|MJ = mJ) ≤ 2−nβ2 for
some β2 > 0, where β2 does not depend on mJ .
Given MJ = mJ , we have that (K0,K1) → (Tj ,K1) →
Znj forms a Markov chain. Hence, by data processing inequal-
ity, we have I(K0K1;Znj |MJ = mJ ) ≤ I(K1Tj ;Znj |MJ =
mJ) ≤ 2−nβ2 . Thus, averaging over mJ , we have
I(K0K1;Z
n
j |MJ) ≤ I(K1Tj;Znj |MJ) ≤ 2−nβ2.
Further, for any j ∈ {1, · · · , J} and when MJ = mJ ,
Zn1 · · ·Znj−1 → K0K1 → Znj
forms a Markov chain as Xnj is determined by (K0K1, mJ )
and the randomness of sampling Xnj from CK1Tj , and Znj is
determined by Xnj and the noise in channel W2. Hence,
I(K0K1;Z
n
j |Zn1 · · ·Znj−1,MJ = mJ)
≤ I(K0K1;Znj |MJ = mJ).
Averaging over mJ , we have
I(K0K1;Z
n
j |Zn1 · · ·Znj−1MJ) ≤ I(K0K1;Znj |MJ). (5)
Hence, by chain rule of mutual information,
I(K0K1;Z
n
1 · · ·ZnJMJ)
= I(K0K1;M
J) + I(K0K1;Z
n
1 · · ·ZnJ |MJ)
= I(K0K1;Z
n
1 · · ·ZnJ |MJ), (K0K1 is indep of MJ)
≤
∑
j
I(K0K1;Z
n
j |MJ) ≤ J2−nβ2 .
This concludes our proof.
The second lemma will be used to show that the conditional
distribution of secret key on the decision bit is almost uniform.
Lemma 5: Let K and V be RVs over K and V respectively.
Then for any v ∈ V and any Kv ⊆ K,
|PK|V=v(Kv)− PK(Kv)| ≤
1
2
SD(PK|V=v;PK). (6)
Proof: As SD(PX1 ;PX2) = 2maxA⊆X {PX1(A) −
PX2(A)} for any RVs X1, X2 over X , PK|V=v(Kv) −
PK(Kv) ≤ 12SD(PK|V=v;PK). Similarly, −PK|V=v(Kv) +
PK(Kv) ≤ 12SD(PK|V=v;PK). Hence, the lemma follows.
The following lemmas will useful in our security proof later.
Lemma 6 means that T ′T and K are almost independent. It
will be used to assign a value for δ1 in Theorem 1 (3-a).
Lemma 6: Let {hk0}k0∈K0 be any family of functions from
M to T . Let K0,K1, U,M ′,M be RVs over K0,K1,U ,M
and M respectively with M ′,M being deterministic in U .
Assume K1 is independent of (K0,M). Let T ′ = hK0(M ′)
and T = hK0(M). Then, for ∆ = SD(K0K1|U ;K0K1),
SD(PT ′T |K1 ;PT ′T ) ≤
√
2∆ ln
|K0||K1|
∆
. (7)
Proof: We have
I(T ′;K1|T ) ≤ I(UK0;K1|T )
= I(U ;K1|TK0), (as I(K0;K1|T ) = 0)
= H(K1|TK0)−H(K1|UTK0)
= H(K1)−H(K1|UK0),
(K1 is ind. of TK0; K0U determines T )
= I(K1;UK0)
= I(K1;U |K0), (K0 and K1 are ind.)
≤ I(K0K1;U).
On the other hand, by Lemma 1,
I(T ′;K1|T = t)
≥
(∑
k1
PK1|T=t(k1)SD(PT ′|T=t;PT ′|K1T=k1t)
)2
2 ln 2
.
By the convexity of f(x) = x2, we have
I(T ′;K1|T ) =
∑
t
PT (t)I(T
′;K1|T = t)
≥
(∑
k1,t
PK1T (k1, t)SD(PT ′|T=t;PT ′|K1T=k1t)
)2
2 ln 2
.
So ∑
k1,t
PK1T (k1, t)SD(PT ′|T=t;PT ′|K1T=k1t)
≤
√
2I(K0K1;U) ln 2.
Independence between K1 and T together with Lemma 1 gives
the result (after reformatting the left side).
The following lemma will be used to assign a value for δ2
in Theorem 1 (3-c) and to show that the third condition in
Theorem 1 (3) can be satisfied.
Lemma 7: Let {hk0}k0∈K0 be a family of ǫ-ASU hash
functions from M to T . Let U,M ′,M be RVs over U ,M and
M respectively s.t. M ′,M are deterministic in U . Let K0 be
uniformly random over K0, T ′ = hK0(M ′) and T = hK0(M).
If P (M ′ = M) = 0, then there exists function d(t′, t) s.t.∑
t′,t d(t
′, t) ≤ SD(K0|U ;K0) and
PT ′T (t
′, t) ≤ d(t′, t) + ǫ|T | .
Proof: Let K0(u, t′, t) be the set of k0 so that hk0(m′) =
t′ and hk0(m) = t, where m′,m are the values of
M ′ and M determined by U = u. Let d(t′, t) =∑
u |PK0U (K0(u, t′, t), u)− PK0(K0(u, t′, t))PU (u)|. Then,
PT ′T (t
′, t) =
∑
u
PK0U (K0(u, t′, t), u)
≤ d(t′, t) +
∑
u
PK0(K0(u, t′, t)PU (u)
≤ d(t′, t) + ǫ|T | , as |K0(u, t
′, t)| ≤ ǫ|K0||T |
7For any u, {K0(u, t, t′)}t,t′ are disjoint. Hence,
SD(K0|U ;K0)
=
∑
k0,u
|PK0U (k0, u)− PK0(k0)PU (u)|
≥
∑
t,t′,u
|PK0U (K0(u, t′, t), u)− PK0(K0(u, t′, t))PU (u)|
=
∑
t,t′
d(t′, t).
This completes the proof.
A. Authentication Theorem
Now we prove our authentication theorem. We need to show
that sender Alice can authenticate polynomial number of mes-
sages using (K0,K1), where the attacker Oscar can adaptively
interleave two types of attacks. In Type I attack, when Alice
sends out (M,Xn), Oscar can revise M to M ′(6= M); in Type
II attack, Oscar can send any pair (Mˆ, Yˆ n) to Bob noiselessly.
Oscar succeeds, if gT ′(Y n) ∈ CK1T ′ in a Type I attack (where
T ′ = hK0(M
′)), or gTˆ (Yˆ n) ∈ CK1Tˆ in a Type II attack (where
Tˆ = hK0(Mˆ)). Our proof idea is as follows. We use bit bℓ = 1
to denote the success of Oscar in the ℓth attack (either Type
I or Type II). In a type I attack, there are two cases: (1)
hK0(M
′) = hK0(M) (i.e., T = T ′), in which case Oscar
succeeds with high probability by the completeness of the
coding scheme (f, g); (2) gT ′(Y n) ∈ CK1T ′ but T 6= T ′. For
case (1), if M ′ is independent of K0, then the success of Oscar
occurs with probability ǫ by the property of h. Conceivably,
if M ′ is almost independent of K0 (i.e., SD(K0|M ′;K0) is
small), Oscar still succeeds with a small probability. Notice
that M ′ is determined by the view Uℓ of Oscar. Hence, it
suffices to show that SD(K0|Uℓ;K0) is small. For case (2),
we can use Theorem 1 (3) to show that the success probability
is small. For type II attack, if (Mˆ, Yˆ ) (determined by Uℓ)
is independent of K1, then gTˆ (Yˆ n) ∈ CK1Tˆ holds with
probability 1|K1| . Conceivably, if SD(K1|Uℓ;K1) is small, then
this should hold with a small success probability change. As
SD(Kc|Uℓ;Kc) ≤ SD(K0K1|Uℓ;K0K1) for c = 0, 1, we
only need to prove that SD(K0K1|Uℓ;K0K1) is small, which
can be done by properly combining Lemmas 4-7.
Theorem 2: Let I(X ;Y ) ≥ I(X ;Z) + τ , where Y, Z are
the outputs of W1,W2 with input X and PX is a type P with
P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X . Assume h : M × K0 → T is an ǫ-
ASU hash function with ǫ = min{2−Ω(logn), 2n
ω
|T | } for some
ω ∈ (0, 1) and |K1| = 2Ω(logn), where g(n) = Ω(log n) if
limn→∞
g(n)
logn =∞. Then, our MAC is secure.
Proof: From Theorem 1 (1), the completeness of the
MAC holds. Now we concentrate on the authentication prop-
erty.
Let Mν = M1 · · ·Mν be the sequence of messages au-
thenticated from Alice to Bob and Xni , Zni be the input and
output w.r.t. Mi over channel W2. Note Mν is chosen by
Alice according to distribution PMν (especially independent
of Oscar’s random tape R); Xni is determined by (K0K1,Mi)
together with the randomness of sampling Xni from CK1T ; Zni
is determined by Xni together with the noise in channel W2.
It follows that (Mν ,K0K1, Xn1 Zn1 · · ·Xnν Znν ) is independent
of R and hence has the same distribution as when Oscar does
not present. Hence, by Lemma 4, I(K0K1;M jZn1 · · ·Znj ) ≤
j2−nβ2, for a constant β2 > 0 and any j ≤ ν.
As (M j,K0K1, Xn1 Zn1 · · ·Xnj Znj ) is independent of R,
I(K0K1;RM
jZn1 · · ·Znj ) ≤ j2−nβ2 . Let K
def
= K0K1 and
Vj
def
= RM jZn1 · · ·Znj . By Lemma 1,
SD(K|Vj ;K) ≤
√
2j ln 2 · 2−nβ2/2. (8)
According to the adversary model, Oscar can adaptively
interleave the following attacks.
I. When Alice sends out (Mj , Xnj ), Oscar can revise Mj
to M ′j(6= Mj). He succeeds if Bob accepts (M ′j , Y nj ).
II. At any time, Oscar can send a pair (Mˆ, Yˆ n) to Bob
noiselessly. He succeeds if Bob accepts this pair.
We use bit bℓ to denote the result of the ℓth attack (either type
I or type II above) and set bℓ = 1 if and only if he succeeds.
Assume the authentication of M jℓ−1 by Alice has been
completed before Oscar launches the ℓth attack. Then,
the view of Oscar right before the ℓth attack is Uℓ :=
(Vjℓ−1, b1, · · · , bℓ−1), where a party’s view is defined as his
random tape R and the data received externally.
If the ℓth attack is Type I, then bℓ = 1 iff gT ′
jℓ
(Y njℓ ) ∈
CK1T ′jℓ for T
′
jℓ
= hK0(M
′
jℓ
). If we define event T ′jℓ = Tjℓ(:=
hK0(Mjℓ)) by colℓ, and event gT ′jℓ (Y
n
jℓ
) ∈ CK1T ′jℓ with Tjℓ 6=
T ′jℓ , by misℓ, then P (bℓ = 1) = P (colℓ) + P (misℓ).
If the ℓth attack is Type II, then bℓ = 1 iff gTˆℓ(Yˆ
n
ℓ ) ∈ CK1Tˆℓ
for Tˆℓ = hK0(Mˆℓ), where (Mˆℓ, Yˆ nℓ ) is Oscar’s output in this
attack.
If L is the upper bound on the number of attacks by Oscar,
then his success probability is Pr
(∨Lℓ=1bℓ = 1) .
As every successful attacker must experience the first suc-
cessful attack, we restrict to an attacker who will stop after the
first successful attack. So bℓ = 1 implies b1 = · · · = bℓ−1 = 0.
Denote the original authentication game by Γ. Now we
modify Γ to Γ′ such that in Type I attack, bℓ
def
= colℓ (instead
of bℓ
def
= colℓ ∨misℓ).
Consider an adversary Oscar′ for Γ′ who simply follows the
code of Oscar by setting each (unknown) misℓ as 0 (even if
it is 1). The view of Oscar′ in Γ′ differs from that of Oscar
in Γ only if misℓ = 1 in Γ′ for some ℓ. Thus,
P (succ(Γ)) ≤ P (succ(Γ′)) +
∑
ℓ
P (misℓ(Γ′)). (9)
As P (succ(Γ′)) ≤ ∑Lℓ=1 P (bℓ(Γ′) = 1), we only need to
bound P (bℓ(Γ′) = 1) and P (misℓ(Γ′)).
Bounding P (misℓ(Γ′)). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 8: P (misℓ(Γ′)) ≤ 2−ςnω +
√
2∆ ln |K0||K1|∆ + ∆
for a constant ς > 0, where ∆ = SD(K|Uℓ;K).
Proof. We first show that UℓMjℓ → K1Tjℓ → Xnjℓ → Y njℓ
forms a Markov chain. This follows from two facts:
(a) Given Xnjℓ , Y njℓ is completely determined by the
noise in channel W1 while this noise occurs after fixing
(Xnjℓ ,K1TjℓUℓMjℓ) and hence is independent of the latter;
8(b) Given K1Tjℓ , Xnjℓ is determined by the randomness
for sampling it from CK1Tjℓ , which is independent of UℓMjℓ .
By Theorem 1(3) with δ1 from Lemma 7
and δ2 from Lemma 6, together with the fact
SD(K0|Uℓ;K0) ≤ SD(K0K1|Uℓ;K0K1) (from triangle
inequality), the lemma follows. 
Bounding P (bℓ(Γ′) = 1). Our analysis is for Γ′. Let U¯ℓ =
(V, b1, · · · , bℓ−1), where V = RMνZn1 · · ·Znν . We use U¯0ℓ to
denote the set of possible values for U¯ℓ with b1 · · · bℓ−1 =
0ℓ−1. So P (bℓ = 1) =
∑
uℓ∈U¯0ℓ
P (bℓ = 1, U¯ℓ = uℓ).
For given V = v, let uℓ = v|0ℓ−1, ℓ = 1, · · · , L.
Type I attack case: In this case, bℓ = colℓ. As M ′jℓ ,Mjℓ
are deterministic in Uℓ (part of U¯ℓ),
Euℓ
def
= {(k0, k1) ∈ K : hk0(M ′j) 6= hk0(Mj)}
is completely determined by U¯ℓ = uℓ. Hence,
Pr(bℓ = 1|U¯ℓ = uℓ) = PK|U¯ℓ=uℓ(Ecuℓ)
≤ PK(Ecuℓ) +
1
2
SD(PK|U¯ℓ=uℓ ;PK) (by Lemma 5)
≤ ǫ+ 1
2
SD(PK|U¯ℓ=uℓ ;PK).
Averaging over U¯ℓ, Pr(bℓ = 1) ≤ ǫ+ 12SD(PK|U¯ℓ ;PK).
Type II attack case: In this case, given U¯ℓ = uℓ, since view
Uℓ of Oscar′ is part of U¯ℓ, it follows (Mˆℓ, Yˆ nℓ ) is deterministic
in uℓ. Since C·t is a code with decoder gt(·), gTˆℓ(Yˆ nℓ ) ∈ CK1Tˆℓ
holds for at most one K1 when K0 and uℓ are fixed. Thus,
given U¯ℓ = uℓ, bℓ = 1 holds for at most |K0| choices of
(K0,K1). Let Euℓ = {(k0, k1) : gTˆℓ(Yˆ nℓ ) =⊥}. Then
Pr(bℓ = 1|U¯ℓ = uℓ)
≤ PK|U¯ℓ=uℓ(Ecuℓ)
≤ 1|K1| +
1
2
SD(PK|U¯ℓ=uℓ ;PK) (by Lemma 5)
Averaging over U¯ℓ, Pr(bℓ = 1) ≤ 1|K1| + 12SD(PK|U¯ℓ ;PK).
Bounding SD(PK|U¯ℓ ;PK). Given U¯ℓ = uℓ = v0ℓ−1, we
must have K ∈ Eui for any i < ℓ. So K ∈ Kℓv
def
= ∩ℓ−1i=1Eui .
In Type I attack, bℓ in Γ′ is determined by (K0,M ′jℓ ,Mjℓ),
which is further determined by (K0, Vjℓ , b1, · · · , bℓ−1). In
Type II attack, bℓ in Γ′ is determined by (K, Mˆℓ, Yˆℓ),
which is further determined by (K,Vjℓ , b1, · · · , bℓ−1). It fol-
lows that (b1, · · · , bℓ) is deterministic in (K,V ). As U¯ℓ =
(V, b1, · · · , bℓ−1), from rule PAB = PAPB|A, we have
PKU¯ℓ(k, uℓ) = PKV (k, v) if (b1, · · · , bℓ−1) determined by
(k, v) is 0ℓ−1; 0 otherwise. Note Kℓv is the set of all possible
k such that (b1, · · · , bℓ−1) determined by (k, v) is 0ℓ−1. Thus,
PU¯ℓ(uℓ) =
∑
k∈Kℓv
PKV (k, v) = PKV (Kℓv, v). (10)
Hence,
SD(PK|U¯ℓ ;PK)
=
∑
v
∑
k∈Kℓv
|PKV (k, v)− PKV (Kℓv, v)PK(k)|
+
∑
v
∑
k 6∈Kℓv
|PKV (Kℓv, v)PK(k)|
≤SD(K|V ;K) + 2
∑
v
PKV (K\Kℓv, v)
≤2SD(K|V ;K) + 2
∑
v
PK(K\Kℓv)PV (v), (Lemma 5)
≤2SD(K|V ;K) + 2(ℓ− 1)ǫ′,
where ǫ′ = max(ǫ, 1|K1| ).
Finalizing the bound on P (succ(Γ)). As Uℓ is part of U¯ℓ,
it follows that SD(K|Uℓ;K) ≤ SD(K|U¯ℓ;K). Notice
SD(K|V ;K) ≤
√
2ν ln 2·2−nβ2/2. By Lemma 8 and calculus
analysis, there exists ς ′ > 0 and ω′ < ω such that P (misℓ(Γ′))
is bounded by
2−ς
′nω
′
+
√
4(ℓ− 1)ǫ′ ln |K0||K1|
2(ℓ− 1)ǫ′ + 2(ℓ− 1)ǫ
′.
Summarizing the bound on P (bℓ = 1), we have P (bℓ = 1) ≤√
2ν ln 2 · 2−nβ2/2 + ℓǫ′.
As P (succ(Γ′)) ≤ ∑ℓ P (bℓ(Γ′) = 1) and ν is polynomi-
ally bounded, Eq. (9) gives
P (succ(Γ))
≤
∑
ℓ
P (misℓ(Γ′)) +
∑
ℓ
P (bℓ(Γ
′) = 1)
≤ 2−ς′′nω
′
+
L∑
ℓ=1
(
√
4(ℓ− 1)ǫ′ ln |K0||K1|
2(ℓ− 1)ǫ′ + 3ℓǫ
′)
≤ 2−ς′′nω
′
+ 2L
√
Lǫ′ ln
|K0||K1|
ǫ′
+ 3L2ǫ′,
for some ς ′′ > 0. This is negligible as L is polynomial in n
and ǫ′ is negligible. This completes our theorem.
VI. EFFICIENCY
The following definitions are defined in the introduction
and we repeat them here for convenience. In the proposed
MAC scheme, the authentication rate ρauth can be rewritten
as ρauth = ρtag · ρchan, where ρtag = log |M|log |T | and ρchan =
log |T |
n . We call ρtag the tag rate and ρchan the channel coding
rate. Tag rate ρtag is mainly determined by cryptographic
techniques.
For our construction, the constraint for T is T ⊂ [J]. The
constraint for J is log Jn < H(X |Y ) + τ (Theorem 1), where
τ only has the constraint H(X |Z) > H(X |Y ) + τ (Theorem
1 and Theorem 2). So for any δ ∈ (0, H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )),
we can define τ = H(X |Z) − H(X |Y ) − δ/2 and then set
|T | = J = 2n(H(X|Z)−δ). Under this, log |T |n = H(X |Z)− δ.
We can summarize this observation as follows.
9Corollary 1: Keep conditions in Theorem 2. For any δ ∈
(0, H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )), let τ = H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )− δ/2.
Then our MAC is secure with ρauth = [H(X |Z)− δ] · ρtag .
A. Comparison with A Natural Scheme
In our MAC construction, we first compute T and then
encode it to Xn using the code in Theorem 1. A natural variant
scheme is similar to ours, except that T is encoded to Xn using
the classic secrecy code of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6], where the
decoding is simply to decode T and check its consistency
with M ′. The security of this scheme is straightforward as
T is fully protected. Let the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel (W1,W2) is Cs. Then the authentication rate of this
scheme is ρauth = ρtagCs. According to [6], if channel W1 is
less noisy than channel W2, then Cs = H(X |Z)−H(X |Y ).
Under this, the ratio of the authentication rate of this scheme
to ours is arbitrarily close to 1−H(X |Y )/H(X |Z) < 1 (as
δ can be arbitrarily small).
The above observation is surprising. Indeed, since T in the
natural scheme is encoded using the capacity achieving code,
the above comparison seems to signify that our MAC does
not protect T in its full secrecy because we have achieved a
higher rate. Our explanation for this is as follows. The secrecy
capacity of a wiretap channel has two tasks: (a) the adversary
has no information about the secret message; (b) the legal
receiver Bob should be able to recover the secret message. In
our setting, we only need to handle task (a) but not (b), as Bob
can recover T from M ′ in the noiseless channel (if M ′ = M )
while when M ′ 6= M , his job is only to realize and reject the
authentication. So in our scheme, there is no guarantee that
Bob can recover T from Y n.
B. Realization of our MAC
To realize our scheme, we only need to specify hk and
K0,K1 and τ. Let τ = H(X |Z) − H(X |Y ) − δ/2 as in
Corollary 1. Then, ρauth = [H(X |Z) − δ] · ρtag. Further,
we realize hk with sq -ASU in Lemma 2, where |K0| = qs,
|M| = q2s and |T | = q. Let |K1| = 2log2 n. It is easy
to verify that under this setup, the security condition in
our authentication theorem is satisfied as long as s < 2nω
for some ω ∈ (0, 1). As a result, ρtag = 2s and hence
ρauth = [H(X |Z)−δ]2s, where s < 2nω for some ω ∈ (0, 1).
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered an authentication problem, in which Alice
authenticated a source M over a wiretap channel (W1,W2)
under the assistant of a noiseless channel. Alice and Bob
shared a secret key. We studied the framework, where Alice
sent the insecure information S over the noiseless channel
and an encoded tag T over the wiretap channel. We proposed
an efficient MAC scheme for wiretap channel (W1,W2), in
which the authentication rate beat the intuitively best possible
result. An immediate open problem is how to construct a
computationally efficient protocol (instead of channel efficient
one studied in this paper).
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix we provide the proof of Theorem 1.
A. Preparation
Let X,Y be RVs over X and Y respectively with
a joint distribution PXY . Let (Xn, Y n) be n indepen-
dent outputs according to PXY . In this case, (Xn, Y n) is
called a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS) with
generic variables X,Y . For A ⊆ Xn, let P˜XnY n be the
joint distribution of (Xn, Y n), conditional on Xn ∈ A.
That is, P˜XnY n(xn, yn)
def
= PnXY (x
n, yn)/PnX(A) for any
xn ∈ A, yn ∈ Yn. Marginal distributions P˜Xn(xn) =∑
yn∈Yn P
n
XY (x
n, yn)/PnX(A) = PnX(xn)/PnX(A) and
P˜Y n(y
n) =
∑
xn∈A P
n
XY (x
n, yn)/PnX(A).
For any index set B, any collection of disjoint subsets
{Ab}b∈B with ∪b∈BAb = A forms a partition of A. Of course,
a partition of A does not depend on the index set B. The
generality of B is only for our ease of presentation.
For a partition {Ab}b∈B of A, let P˜Y n|b(yn) def= P˜ (Y n =
yn|Xn ∈ Ab). That is,
P˜Y n|b(y
n) =
∑
xn∈Ab
P˜XnY n(x
n, yn)/P˜Xn(Ab) (11)
=
∑
xn∈Ab
PnXY (x
n, yn)/PnX(Ab). (12)
In other words, P˜Y n|b equals the marginal distribution of Y n
in PnXY , conditional on Xn ∈ Ab.
A partition can also be characterized through a mapping.
Specifically, for mapping σ : A → B, let Ab def= σ−1(b) for
b ∈ B. Then {Ab}b∈B forms a partition of A. On the other
hand, given a partition {A}b∈B, we can define σ : A → B by
σ(x) = b for all x ∈ Ab. Thus, when the context is clear, we
will simply call a mapping σ a partition of size |B| for A.
For any partition σ : A → B, σ(Xn) has a distribution
induced by random variable Xn. As σ(xn) = b if and only
if xn ∈ Ab, we have Pr(σ(Xn) = b) = P˜Xn(Ab) =
PnX(Ab)/PnX(A). Thus, under P˜XnY n for (Xn, Y n),
SD(Y n|σ(Xn);Y n)
=
∑
b∈B
P˜Xn(Ab)
∑
yn∈Yn
|P˜Y n|b(yn)− P˜Y n(yn)|
=
∑
b∈B
P˜Xn(Ab)SD(P˜Y n|b; P˜Y n). (13)
If PX = P for a type P and A = TnP , Csisza´r [7] showed
that when k is not too large, there exists a partition σ that
partitions TnP into k subsets of almost equal size so that σ(Xn)
is almost independent of Y n. This is the following.
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Lemma 9: [7] DMC W : X → Y has input X and output
Y , where X is according to a type P with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X .
Then, for any τ > 0, there exists β > 0 such that when n
large enough and k ≤ |TnP |2−n(I(X;Y )+τ), TnP has a partition
σ : TnP → {1, · · · , k} satisfying
|Ai| = |T
n
P |
k
(1+ǫi), SD(Y n|σ(Xn);Y n) < 2−nβ, (14)
where Ai = σ−1(i) and |ǫi| ≤ 2−nβ. Moreover, if σ is
uniformly random among all possible partitions, then Eq. (14)
holds, except for an exponentially small (in n) probability.
Remark. This lemma can be trivially generalized to the
setting σ′ : TnP → B with |B| = k as the result does not
depend on the choice of B. Specifically, for any σ in the
lemma and B = {b1, · · · , bk}, define σ′ = σ ◦ π, where
mapping π : B → {1, · · · , k} with π(bi) 7→ i is one-one. With
Abi = Ai, σ satisfies Eq. (14) if and only if σ ◦ π satisfies
the corresponding properties with index set B. Later, we will
reference this lemma for a general B without a justification.
For any set A, there are k|A| partitions of size k. One can
sample a uniformly random partition σ : A → B by assigning
σ(x) to a uniformly random element b in B for each x ∈
A, b ∈ B. This view will be used in the following theorem.
B. Useful lemmas
Now, we present some lemmas that will be used to prove
theorem 1 later. The first lemma bounds E[|(T[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩
T[W ]ǫ(Zn1 )|] for randomly chosen Zn1 , Zn2 with type PX .
Our idea is to notice that for a random subset B of S,
E(|B|) =∑y∈S P (y ∈ B). So we only need to bound∑
yn
P (yn ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(Zn1 )). (15)
It is easy to show that yn ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Zn) for a typical Zn (Zn
with type PX satisfies this) implies Zn ∈ Tn[X|Y ]ǫ(yn). So Eq.
(15) is bounded by ∑yn P (Zn1 , Zn2 ∈ Tn[X|Y ]ǫ(yn)). Notice
that Zn1 , Zn2 are independent and P (Zn ∈ Tn[X|Y ]ǫ(yn)) ≈
2−nI(X;Y ). The desired bound for Eq. (15) can be obtained
by direct calculations.
Lemma 10: Assume RVs X and Y are connected by DMC
W : X → Y where PX = P for some type P . Let (Zn1 , Zn2 )
be a uniformly randomly pair from TnP . Then, there exists a
constant c > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0, when n large enough,
E
(
|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 )|
)
≤ 2n[H(Y |X)−I(X;Y )+cǫ]. (16)
Proof: For a fixed set S and its random subset B ⊆
S, E(|B|) = E(∑y∈S 1B(y)) = ∑y∈S P (y ∈ B), where
1B(y) = 1 if y ∈ B and 0 otherwise. Thus,
E
(
|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 )|
)
(17)
=
∑
yn∈Yn
P (yn ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 )). (18)
Notice that yn ∈ T[W ]ǫ(xn) for xn ∈ TnP implies
|Pxnyn(a, b)− PX(a)PY |X(b|a)| ≤
ǫ
|X ||Y|
for all a, b as PX = P . Summation over a implies
|Pyn(b)− PY (b)| ≤ ǫ|Y| . (19)
This further implies that |Pxnyn(a, b)− Pyn(b)PX|Y (a|b)| ≤
c′ǫ
|X ||Y| for some constant c
′ > 0. So for xn ∈ TnP , yn ∈
T[W ]ǫ(xn) implies xn ∈ Tn[X|Y ]c′ǫ(yn). It follows that {xn ∈
TnP : yn ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(xn)} ⊆ {xn ∈ TnP : xn ∈ Tn[X|Y ]c′ǫ(yn)} ⊆
Tn[X|Y ]c′ǫ(y
n), which has a size at most 2n[H(X|Y )+c′′ǫ] for
some constant c′′ > 0 by Lemma 3 (3). So Eq. (18) gives
∑
yn∈Yn
P (yn ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 ))
=
∑
yn∈Tn
[Y ]ǫ
P (yn ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 ))(by Eq. (19))
≤
∑
yn∈Tn
[Y ]ǫ
P (Zn1 , Z
n
2 ∈ T[X|Y ]n
c′ǫ
(yn))
∗≤
∑
yn∈Tn
[Y ]ǫ
2n[H(X|Y )+c
′′ǫ]
|TnP |
× 2
n[H(X|Y )+c′′ǫ]
|TnP | − 1
≤ 2(n+ 1)2|X |
∑
yn∈Tn
[Y ]ǫ
2−2n[I(X;Y )−c
′′ǫ] (Lemma 3(1))
≤ 2−n[I(X;Y )−H(Y |X)−(2c′′+c∗+1)ǫ] (Lemma 3(2)),
for some c∗ > 0. Ineq (*) holds as Zn1 , Zn2 is a uniformly
random pair in TnP . The lemma holds with c = 2c′′ + c∗ + 1.
The second lemma essentially states that if we randomly
sample a subset A of size at most 2n(I(X;Y )−τ) from TnP
for some τ > 0, then most likely A is an error-correcting
code with an exponentially small error. The basic idea
is simple. By the previous lemma, if the sampled set is
{Zn1 , · · · , Znℓ }, then Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) ∩ ∪j 6=iTn[W ]ǫ(Znj ) has a size
of roughly 2n(H(Y |X)−τ), which is an exponentially small part
of Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ). So A is a code under a typical decoding that
has an exponentially small error. The formal proof is to make
the above rough idea rigorous through probability arguments.
Lemma 11: Let P be a type over X . Assume integer ℓ ≤
2n(I(X;Y )−τ) for some τ > 0 and RVs X and Y are connected
by DMC W : X → Y with PX = P . Let A := {Zn1 , · · · , Znℓ }
(indexed randomly) be a purely random subset of TnP of size
ℓ. Let (f, g) be a code with codebook A, where encoding f :
[ℓ] → A, f(i) 7→ Zni , and decoding g(Y n) = i if there exists
a unique i s.t. Y n ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) and g(Y n) =⊥ otherwise.
Then, there exist constants λ > 0, ǫ0 > 0 (not depending on
ℓ) such that with probability at least 1 − 2−nτ/2 (over the
choice of A), we have e(A) ≤ 2−nλǫ2 , for any ǫ < ǫ0 and
when n large enough.
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Proof: We first compute
E(|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) ∩ ∪j 6=iTn[W ]ǫ(Znj )|)
≤
∑
j∈[ℓ]\{i}
E
(
|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Znj )|
)
≤ ℓ ·E
(
|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn1 ) ∩ Tn[W ]ǫ(Zn2 )|
)
(Zn1 , · · · , Znℓ are symmetric)
≤ ℓ · 2−n[I(X;Y )−H(Y |X)−cǫ] (by Lemma 10)
≤ 2n[H(Y |X)−τ+cǫ], n large enough
for some constant c > 0. Hence,
n∑
i=1
1
ℓ
E(|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) ∩ ∪j 6=iTn[W ]ǫ(Znj )|) ≤ 2n[H(Y |X)−τ+cǫ].
By Markov inequality, with probability 1− 2−nτ/2 (over A),
n∑
i=1
1
ℓ
|Tn[W ]ǫ(Zni ) ∩ ∪j 6=iTn[W ]ǫ(Znj )| ≤ 2n[H(Y |X)−
τ
2+cǫ].
Denote the collection of such A by A.
By Lemma 3 (3), there exists constant cˆ > 0 s.t.
PnY |X(y
n|xn) ≤ 2−n[H(Y |X)−cˆǫ], ∀ǫ > 0, ∀xn ∈ TnP , ∀yn ∈
T[W ]ǫ(xn). So there exists constant c′ > 0 s.t. for any A ∈ A,
when I is uniformly random in [ℓ],
P
(
Y n ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(ZnI ) ∩ ∪j 6=ITn[W ]ǫ(Znj )
)
≤ 2−n(τ/2−c′ǫ). (20)
Note an error occurs only if Y n ∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(ZnI ) ∩
∪j 6=ITn[W ]ǫ(Znj ) or if Y n 6∈ Tn[W ]ǫ(ZnI ). Thus, by Lemma 3
(4), there exists constant λ0 > 0 s.t. e(A) ≤ 2−n(τ/2−c′ǫ) +
2−nλ0ǫ
2
. Lemma follows with λ < λ0 and ǫ0 small enough
(dependent on τ, c′, λ0).
The lemma below states that a random subset A of TnP with
|A| = ℓ is uniformly random over all subsets with size ℓ.
Lemma 12: For a type P and integer s, a subset A ⊆ TnP
is sampled by including each xn ∈ TnP with probability 1/s.
Then given |A| = ℓ, A is uniformly random over all possible
subsets of TnP of size ℓ.
Proof. Let N = |TnP |. Then, a particular set A of size ℓ is
sampled with probability s−ℓ(1 − 1/s)N−ℓ, which does not
depend on the specific element of A. So given |A| = ℓ, A
occurs with probability 1/
(
N
ℓ
)
. 
For s < |TnP |2−n(I(X;Y )−θ), in the following lemma, we
want to claim that for a random partition A1, · · · ,As of TnP ,
with high probability, most of Aj ’s are codes. Our proof
strategy is mainly to repeatedly use the following fact: if
E(X) ≤ L for L > 0 and RV X , then P (X > uL) ≤ 1/u
for any u > 0. This fact is a simple consequence of Markov
inequality.
Lemma 13: Let RVs X,Y be connected by DMC W .
For a type P and s = |TnP |2−n(I(X;Y )−θ), A1, · · · ,As
is a random partition of TnP : for each xn ∈ TnP , take a
uniformly random i ∈ [s] and put xn into Ai. Regard Aj
with |Aj | ≤ 2I(X;Y )−θ/2 as a code in Lemma 11 and Aj
with |Aj | > 2I(X;Y )−θ/2 as a code of error 1. Then, there
exist constants λ > 0, ǫ0 > 0 such that, with probability
1 − 2−nθ/8+1 (over the randomness of partition), there are
at most 2−nθ/8s possible j’s with e(Aj) > 2−nλǫ2 , for any
ǫ < ǫ0.
Proof: By Lemma 12, given |Aj | = ℓ, Aj is uniformly
random over all possible subsets of TnP of size ℓ. So by Lemma
11, given |Aj | = ℓ ≤ 2I(X;Y )−θ/2, there exist constants λ > 0
and ǫ0 > 0 (not depending on ℓ) such that, with probability
1− 2−nθ/4, Aj is a code with
e(Aj) ≤ 2−nλǫ
2
, (21)
for any ǫ < ǫ0. Here by symmetry ofA1, · · · ,As, we have that
ǫ0 and λ are invariant with j. On the other hand, as E(|Aj |) =
|TnP |/s = 2n(I(X;Y )−θ), from Markov inequality,
P (|Aj | > 2n(I(X;Y )− θ2 )) ≤ 2−nθ/2. (22)
Define Boolean function F (Aj) = 1 if and only if either
Aj violates Eq. (21) or |Aj | > 2n(I(X;Y )− θ2 ). In other words,
F (Aj) = 1 if and only if e(Aj) > 2−nλǫ2 . Then, P (F (Aj) =
1) < 2−nθ/4+1. Thus,
E
(1
s
s∑
j=1
F (Aj)
)
≤ 2−nθ/4+1. (23)
Thus, by Markov inequality,
P
(1
s
s∑
j=1
F (Aj) > 2−nθ/8
)
≤ 2−nθ/8+1 (24)
That is, with probability 1 − 2−nθ/8+1 (over the randomness
of a partition), 1s
∑s
j=1 F (Aj) ≤ 2−nθ/8. In other words, with
probability 1− 2−nθ/8+1, there are at most 2−nθ/8s possible
j’s with e(Aj) > 2−nλǫ2 (i.e., F (Aj) = 1).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof idea. We first explain the idea for properties 1 and
2. For 0 < θ < τ , 0 < s1 ≤ 2n[I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)−τ ] and
s2 = | TnP |2−n[I(X;Y )−θ], consider independent and uniformly
random partitions σ1 : TnP → {1, · · · , s1} and σ2 : TnP →
{1, · · · , s2} for TnP . Then, σ = (σ1, σ2) is a random partition
of size s1s2 for TnP . Let Aij = σ−1(i, j). Then by Lemma 9,
|Aij | = |T
n
P |
s1s2
(1 + ǫij) (25)
SD(Zn|σ(Xn);Zn) < 2−nβ1 (26)
for some β1 > 0 and small ǫij ≥ 0. As A·j := A1j ∪ · · · ∪
As1j = σ−12 (j) is a random subset of TnP , by Lemma 13,
most of A·1, · · · ,A·s2 are codes with small errors. If all of
A·1, · · · ,A·s2 are codes with small errors and ǫij = 0, then
properties 1-2 follows by defining Cij = Aij , as in this case,
property 2 is just Eq. (26). For the general case, since ǫij is
small and most of A·j’s are good codes, we can discard A·j
(that is not a good code) and define Cij to be Aij (where A·j
is a good code) except cutting off a small subset of Aij (to
make Cij having an equal size). As the changes are minor, the
resulting C·j’s will remain a good code and satisfy property
2. The main effort in the proof is to make the above idea
rigorous.
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Then, we explain the idea for property 3. We need a fact:
Fact 1. For RVs U, V over U ,V and function F : U×V →
R+ with F (u, v) ≤ α for any u, v and some α > 0, let
PUV (u, v) ≤ βQUV (u, v)+ δuv for some β > 0, δuv > 0 and
any distributions PUV , QUV . Then,
E(F (U, V )) ≤ α
∑
u,v
δuv + β
∑
u,v
QUV (u, v)F (u, v).
Now we come back to the idea for property 3. Notice
that Yˆ n is obtained as follows. We sample I, J and sam-
ple Xˆn from CIJ randomly and finally sends Xˆn through
channel W1. As Yˆ n is typical with Xˆn, with high prob-
ability Yˆ n ∈ Tn[W1]ǫ(CIJ). However, under the typicality
decoding g (in property 1), property 3 requires to bound
P (Yˆ n ∈ Tn[W1]ǫ(CIJ′)) (denoted by µ). We can define
F (i, j, u, j′) = P (Yˆ n ∈ Tn[W1]ǫ(CIJ′)|IJXˆnJ ′ = ijuj′).
Under this, µ = E(F ). By condition (b) in property
3, PJ′IJXˆn = PJ′|IJPIJXˆn , which is further equal to
PJ′|IJPXˆn|IJPIPJ = PJ′IJ/r, where |Cij | = r. By Fact
1 (with α = β = 1, QUV = PUPV ) and condition (a) in
property 3, µ ≤ δ1 + µ∗, where µ∗ is E(F ) with PIJXˆnJ′
defined as PIPJJ′/r. Similarly, by condition (c) in property
3 and Fact 1 (with β = 2nω , α = 1 and QJJ′ = 1J(J−1) ),
we have µ ≤ δ1 + δ2 + 2nωµ′, where µ′ = E(F ) with
PIJXˆnJ′ =
1
rJ(J−1)I . In this case, PIJXˆnJ′ is now explicit
and simple. We calculate based on Lemma 10 to show that
µ′ is roughly r2−nI(X;Y ), which is of 2−nη for some η > 0,
as I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) > 0 and we can set r = 2n(I(X;Z)−η).
Since nη > nω for ω < 1, µ is dominated by δ1 + δ2. This
completes property 3.
With the above ideas in mind, we now implement the proof
details rigorously.
Proof. Part I (for properties 1-2). From our assump-
tion, PX = P . Hence, PXY (x, y) = P (x)W1(y|x)
and PXZ(x, z) = P (x)W2(z|x). Let P˜XnZn(xn, zn) def=
PnXZ(x
n, zn)/PnX(T
n
P ) for xn ∈ TnP and zn ∈ Zn. Then
its marginal distribution P˜Xn(xn) is P˜Xn(xn) = 1|Tn
P
| for
xn ∈ TnP .
For any θ ∈ (0, τ), let s1, s2 be any integers with
1 ≤ s1 ≤ 2n[I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)−τ ],
s2 = | TnP |2−n[I(X;Y )−θ].
Consider independent and uniformly random partitions of TnP ,
σ1 : TnP → {1, · · · , s1} and σ2 : TnP → {1, · · · , s2}.
Then, σ = (σ1, σ2) is a partition of size s1s2 for TnP . Let
A = TnP . By Lemma 9 with Z in the role of Y and σ =
(σ1, σ2) (hence B = [s1]× [s2] in the remark after this lemma
and notice that k = s1s2 ≤ |TnP |2−n(I(X;Z)+(τ−θ))), there
exists n1 > 0, α1 > 0 and β1 > 0 such that the following
holds with probability 1− 2−nα1 (over σ),
|Aij | = |T
n
P |
s1s2
(1 + ǫij) (27)
SD(Zn|σ(Xn);Zn) < 2−nβ1 (28)
for n ≥ n1, where Aij = σ−11 (i)∩σ−12 (j) and |ǫij | ≤ 2−nβ1 .
Let A·j = ∪iAij . Then, A·j = σ−12 (j) and hence {A·j}s2j=1
is the explicit representation of partition σ2. By Lemma 13,
there exist constants λ > 0 and ǫ0 > 0 such that with
probability 1−2−nθ/8+1 (over σ), there are at most 2−nθ/8s2
possible j’s with e(A·j) > 2−nλǫ2 , for any ǫ < ǫ0.
Define Bad(σ) to the event: under σ, either Eqs. (27)(28)
fails, or e(A·j) > 2−nλǫ2 occurs to more than s22−nθ/8 pos-
sible j’s. Then Pr[Bad(σ)] ≤ 2−nc+2 for c = min(α1, θ/8).
From Eqs. (13)(28) and B = [s1]× [s2], noticing
P˜Xn
(
σ−11 (i) ∩ σ−12 (j)
)
= P˜Xn
(
σ−11 (i)
)
· P˜Xn
(
σ−12 (j)
)
(as σ1, σ2 are independent), we have
SD(Zn|σ(Xn);Zn)
=
∑
i,j
P˜Xn(Aij)SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn)
=
s2∑
j=1
P˜Xn(A·j)
(
s1∑
i=1
P˜Xn(Ai·)SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn)
)
≤ 2−nβ1 . (29)
where P˜Xn(Aij) = |Aij ||TnP | =
1
s1s2
+
ǫij
s1s2
for |ǫij | ≤ 2−nβ1 .
Let ǫ¯·j =
∑s1
i=1 ǫij/s1. We have P˜Xn(A·j) = 1s2 +
ǫ¯·j
s2
with
|ǫ¯·j| ≤ 2−nβ1. Thus, as SD(Q1;Q2) ≤ 2 for any distribution
Q1, Q2, Eq. (29) implies
1
s2
s2∑
j=1
(
s1∑
i=1
P˜Xn(Ai·)SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn)
)
< 2−nβ1+2. (30)
Similarly, we obtain
1
s1s2
s2∑
j=1
(
s1∑
i=1
SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn)
)
< 2−nβ1+4. (31)
When Eq. (31) holds, Markov inequality implies the number
of j’s with
1
s1
s1∑
i=1
SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn) < 2−nβ1/2+4 (32)
is at least s2(1− 2−nβ1/2).
For any σ with ¬Bad, we already know that Eq. (31) holds
and the number of j’s with e(A·j) > 2−nλǫ2 is bounded by
s22
−nθ/8
. Hence, if we let J ′ be the set of j such that Eq.
(32) holds and e(A·j) ≤ 2−nλǫ2 , then for any σ with ¬Bad,
|J ′| ≥ s2(1 − 2−nθ/8 − 2−nβ1/2).
For each j ∈ J ′, make |Aij | = |T
n
P |
s1s2
(1 − 2−nβ1) by
cutting a uniformly random subset of a proper size from Aij .
After this, for j ∈ J ′ and i ∈ [s1], denote Aij ,Ai·,A·j
respectively by Cij , Ci·, C·j . Let C = ∪i∈[s1],j∈J ′Cij .
Also update P˜XnZn(xn, zn) = PnXZ(xn, zn)/PnX(A) to
P˜XnZn(x
n, zn) = PnXZ(x
n, zn)/PnX(C). Correspondingly up-
date P˜Xn(xn), P˜Zn . Then, we have P˜Xn(Ci·) = 1/s1. Note
now SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn) is updated by a multiplicative factor
PnX(A)/PnX(C). Hence, Eq. (32) is now updated to
1
s1
s1∑
i=1
SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn) < 2−nβ1+5 (33)
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for every j ∈ J ′. Let J be a uniformly random subset of
J ′ of size J and let I = s1. Then, with probability at least
1− 2−nc+2 over σ (i.e., when ¬Bad occurs), we get J s.t.
1. For any j ∈ J , C·j is a code (fj , gj) with average error
probability at most 2−nλǫ2+1 as the cutting treatment on
Aij can increase the average error probability by at most
1+2−nβ1
1−2−nβ1
< 2.
2. For any j ∈ J , 1s1
∑s1
i=1 SD(P˜Zn|(i,j); P˜Zn) < 2−nβ1+5.
So, for any PIJ = PJ/s1, SD(P˜Zn|(J,I); P˜Zn) < 2−nβ
for β < β1 (not depending on PJ) and n large enough.
Note that limn→∞ 1n log(s2(1 − 2−nθ/8 − 2−nβ1/2)) =
H(X |Y ) + θ and θ is arbitrary in (0, τ). So we can define
J to be any value as long as 1n log J < H(X |Y )+ τ. So J and
I can take any value in the required condition.
So far we have proved that for 1 − 2−nc+2 fraction of σ
(denoted by set Good), uniformly random J from J ′ and
uniformly random Cij from Aij will satisfy properties 1-2.
Note the uniformity of J and Cij is unnecessary for property
1-2 and it is for the proof of property 3 in the following.
Part II (continue for property 3). We continue to prove prop-
erty 3, based on set Good, the uniformity of Cij ,J above
and properties 1-2. We will show that for a large fraction of
Good, there exists some choice of J and Cij (in properties
1-2) that further satisfies property 3.
Let r = |T
n
P |
s1s2
(1 − 2−nβ1), Cij = {u1, · · · , ur} and Cij′ =
{v1, · · · , vr} where elements are ordered uniformly randomly.
Since gj uses typicality decoding (Lemma 11), for any σ,
P
(
gJ′(Yˆ
n) ∈ CIJ′
)
≤ P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
=
∑
i,j′,j,t
PIJJ′Xˆn(i, j, j
′, ut)×
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|IJJ ′Xˆn = ijj′ut
)
=
∑
i,j′,j,t
PIJJ′(i, j, j
′)
1
r
×
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|Xˆn = ut
)
(J ′ → IJ → Xˆn → Yˆ n Markovity assumption)
≤
∑
i,j′,j,t
PJJ′(j, j
′)P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|Xˆn = ut
)
rI
+δ1, (from condition (a) in property 3)
Further by condition (c) in property 3, we have
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
− δ1 − δ2
≤
∑
i,j′,j,t
2n
ω
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|Xˆn = ut
)
rJ(J− 1)I . (34)
Notice
∑
i,j′,j,t
1
IJ(J−1)rP
(
Y˜ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|Xˆn = ut
)
equals P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
but with PIJJ′Xˆn =
1
rIJ(J−1)
(i.e., I, (J, J ′) independent and each uniformly random and
Xˆn uniformly random in CIJ ). We now bound P
(
Yˆ n ∈
T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
under this setting. By Lemma 3 (4),
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
− 2−nλ1ǫ2
≤ P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(Xˆn) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(CIJ′)
)
=
∑
i,j′,j,t
P
(
Yˆ n ∈ T[W ]ǫ(ut) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(Cij′ )|Xˆn = ut
)
IJ(J− 1)r
≤
∑
i,j′,j,t,t′
∣∣∣T[W ]ǫ(ut) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(vt′)∣∣∣
IJ(J − 1)r2n(H(Y |X)−ǫ) , (35)
for some λ1 > 0, where Cij = {u1, · · · , ur} and Cij′ =
{v1, · · · , vr}.
Let ξ be the randomness to select J from J ′ and to select
Csd from Asd for all s, d. Let η be the randomness to order
elements in Csd for all s, d. So far we have assumed ξ, η and
σ are fixed. As J 6= J ′ (so ut 6= vt′ ), it is not hard to see that,
over the randomness of (ξ, η, σ), RV (ut, vt′) for fixed (t, t′)
has a probability distance 2−nγ from a uniformly random pair
(U, V ) in TnP for some constant γ > 0. So
E
( ∑
i,j′,j,t,t′
∣∣∣T[W ]ǫ(ut) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(vt′ )∣∣∣
IJ(J − 1)r2n(H(Y |X)−ǫ)
)
≤ 2−n(γ−2ǫ) + E
( ∑
i,j,t,j′,t′
∣∣∣T[W ]ǫ(U) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(V )∣∣∣
IJ(J− 1)r2n(H(Y |X)−ǫ)
)
≤ 2−nγ/2 + r2−n(I(X;Y )−c′ǫ), (c′ constant, Lemma 10)
= 2−nγ/2 + 2−n(θ−c
′ǫ) ≤ 2−nγ′′+1,
for γ′′ < min{γ/2, θ/2}. So for 1− 2−nγ′′/2+1 fraction of σ,
there exists ξ and η so that∑
i,j′,j,t,t′
|T[W ]ǫ(ut) ∩ T[W ]ǫ(vt′)|
IJ(J− 1)r2n(H(Y |X)−ǫ) ≤ 2
−nγ′′/2. (36)
Denote this set of σ by Good′. Then for σ ∈ Good∩Good′,
from Eq. (35)(36), we know that Eq. (34) is bounded by
2−nλǫ
2+nω + 2−nγ
′′/2+nω . Hence, property 3 is satisfied if
we take ǫ = 3
√
1
n1−ω , as 2
nω−nγ′′/4 + 2−nλ1ǫ
2+nω < 2−n
ω
when n large enough.
As a summary, for P (Good ∩ Good′) > 1 − 2−nc+2 −
2−nγ
′′/2+1 fraction of σ, properties 1-3 are satisfied. 
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